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A Survey of Blockholders 
and Corporate Control
he notion of diffuse stock ownership is well entrenched 
among economists. It started with Adam Smith’s 
legendary warning in Wealth of Nations about the “negligence 
and profusion” that will result when those who manage 
enterprises are “rather of other people’s money than of their 
own.” A century and a half later, another lawyer, Adolf Berle, 
along with a journalist, Gardiner Means, returned to the theme 
of diffuse stock ownership. Since the dawn of capitalism, Berle 
and Means reasoned, most production had taken place in 
relatively small organizations in which the owners were also the 
managers. Beginning in the nineteenth century with the 
Industrial Revolution, however, technological change had 
increased the optimal size of many firms to the point where no 
individual, family, or group of managers would have sufficient 
wealth to own a controlling interest. As a result, enterprises 
faced “the dissolution of the old atom of ownership into its 
component parts, control and beneficial ownership” (Berle and 
Means 1932, p. 8). Ultimately, this separation of ownership 
from control threatens “the very foundation on which the 
economic order of the past three centuries has rested.”
The arguments of Berle and Means on the dangers of diffuse 
stock ownership, written during the depths of the Great 
Depression, had an immediate and profound impact.1 Most 
notably, their arguments helped to shape the federal securities 
legislation of the 1930s. That legislation was intended to protect 
diffuse shareholders from professional managers, and it 
remains the primary federal securities law to this day.
The notion of diffuse ownership has also had a profound 
influence on contemporary economists. This can perhaps best 
be seen in one of the pivotal papers of the postwar era, Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) agency paper. Much of the focus of that 
paper is on the conflict between diffuse shareholders and 
professional managers:
Since the relationship between the stockholders and 
manager of a corporation fit the definition of a pure 
agency relationship, it should be no surprise to discover 
that the issues associated with the “separation of 
ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership 
corporation are intimately associated with the general 
problem of agency. We show . . . that an explanation of 
why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate 
form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or 
capital) structure of the firm.
As economists started to employ this agency perspective, 
it was mainly in the context of diffuse shareholders and 
professional managers. This, for example, can be seen in the 
papers in a special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics on 
the market for corporate control in 1983. Many of these papers 
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have become widely cited. It is illuminating, however, that 
among the sixteen papers in the special issue, there is little 
mention of large-percentage shareholders or managerial stock 
ownership.2 In the issue’s review article (Jensen and Ruback 
1983), stock ownership, be it by mangers or by outsiders, was 
not listed as a direction for future research.
After the volume was published, researchers began to 
discover that some public corporations had large-percentage 
shareholders, many of whom were top managers or directors. 
Researchers also discovered that some of these corporations 
were large and well known. Concentrated stock ownership, it 
appeared, was not limited to a few anomalous firms. Soon, 
academics began to study the impact of large-block 
shareholders.
Three empirical papers in the mid-1980s set the tone and 
the agenda for much of the research into ownership structure 
that has ensued over the following fifteen years. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) address the question of the types of public 
corporations that are likely to have high levels of managerial 
stock ownership. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) address the 
question of whether major corporate decisions are different 
when a corporation has a large-percentage shareholder. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) address the question of the impact 
on firm value of different levels of managerial stock ownership.
The new focus on ownership structure became evident in 
the next special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics. 
Now, after the passage of only five years, many of the papers 
addressed large shareholders, including the aforementioned 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988a). Moreover, the summary article, coauthored by 
Michael Jensen (who was also a coauthor in the 1983 review 
article that did not allude to ownership structure), identifies 
“ownership structure and the allocation of voting rights” as a 
direction for future research (Jensen and Warner 1988).
In this paper, I survey the academic literature on 
blockholders and corporate control. As with any survey paper, 
I must be selective. Thus, I focus on empirical research, as I 
believe that much of what we know about blockholders has 
come through empirical investigations as opposed to 
theoretical models, although there certainly are some insightful 
theoretical papers on blockholders. Moreover, this paper is not 
a traditional, full-fledged literature survey. Instead, I focus on 
what the literature tells us about four fundamental questions 
associated with blockholders: How prevalent are blockholders? 
What motivates block ownership? What impact do blockholders 
have on certain major corporate decisions? What impact do 
blockholders have on firm value?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes 
the data on the extent of block ownership and how the 
concentration of ownership has changed over time. Section 3 
addresses the motivation of block ownership and the types of 
firms that tend to have concentrated ownership. Section 4 
examines how block ownership affects three major corporate 
decisions: leverage, executive compensation, and the incidence 
of takeovers. Section 5 addresses the complex relationship 
between block ownership and firm value. A brief conclusion 
follows.
2. How Prevalent Are Blockholders?
Although Adam Smith was concerned with the separation of 
ownership and management, he offered no data on the extent 
of this separation. In all likelihood, he did not have the data. 
Moreover, when he was writing, prior to the Industrial 
Revolution, most enterprises were fairly small and were most 
likely owned by a single individual or a family. Corporations 
that were large and diffusely held, such as the East India 
Company, were very much the exception.
Berle and Means, in contrast, did offer data on ownership 
concentration, at least on the stock ownership of management. 
In fact, their book consists of two basic parts: a property-rights 
argument on the importance of the collocation of wealth effects 
and decision rights (“the atom of private property”) and data 
on managerial ownership at a large number of American 
corporations. The fundamental limitation of these data is that, 
with the exception of a few regulated industries, companies at 
the time were not legally required to reveal their owners 
publicly, and few firms voluntarily agreed to do so. Likewise, 
directors and officers, as well as large-percentage shareholders, 
had no legal obligation to report their ownership stakes, and 
almost none did.
The first legal requirement for public reporting of 
ownership came in Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934. That provision mandates that directors, officers, 
and outside holders of at least 10 percent of the stock of any 
firm with equity registered on national securities exchanges 
report their holdings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The SEC collected and published the 
Section 16 reports for share holdings as of December 31, 1935.3 
These are the earliest reliable data on ownership. They have 
been continually updated since then and are the ultimate 
source for virtually all ownership data used in academic 
research.
Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) were the first to 
analyze these ownership data from a time-series perspective. 
They compare a comprehensive cross-section of roughly 1,500 
publicly traded U.S. firms in 1935 with a modern benchmark of 
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managerial ownership was higher in 1995 than in 1935. The 
mean percentage of common stock held by a firm’s officers and 
directors as a group rose from 13 percent in 1935 to 21 percent 
in 1995. Median holdings doubled from 7 percent to 14 percent. 
Although the very largest firms have similar ownership 
percentages in both periods, a firm size-weighted average is 
higher in 1995 than in 1935.
Although most research examines the fraction of a firm held 
by managers, it is an open question whether the dollar value of 
holdings may provide a better indication of a manager’s 
incentives and willingness to make decisions than does 
percentage value of holdings. Holthausen and Larcker (1991) 
argue that “if it is equally difficult to affect firm value by a given 
percentage, say 5 percent of equity value, then dollar value of 
holdings is the appropriate measure, not percentage 
ownership. However, if it is equally difficult to get a given 
dollar magnitude change in the value of the equity, say $1,000, 
then the manager’s percentage ownership is the appropriate 
measure of incentive.” Hanka (1994), in one of the few studies 
to consider both measures, finds that both the percentage of 
stock holdings of management and the dollar value of those 
holdings affect the magnitude of corporate charitable 
donations. Given this evidence of the potential importance of 
the dollar value of holdings, it should be noted that insiders’ 
stock holdings have risen (in real terms) from $18 million in 
1935 to $73 million in 1995. This general increase holds across 
all firm sizes.
Other studies also address the level of inside ownership. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1989) collect officer and director 
ownership data from proxy statements of 240 randomly chosen 
New York Stock Exchange– and American Stock Exchange–
listed firms in three years. They report average inside 
ownership of 19.8 percent in 1973, 20.5 percent in 1978, and 
18.5 percent in 1983. The average ownership for the three years 
pooled is 19.6 percent, and the median is 13.9 percent. 
Similarly, an unpublished study by the Office of the Chief 
Economist of the SEC examined the ownership of 100 
randomly chosen public corporations for 1987 and found 
average inside ownership of  21.2 percent.4 Finally, Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) find that in 1995, insiders on 
average owned 21 percent of the common stock of a randomly 
selected firm (median: 14 percent). As such, 20 percent is the 
best available estimate of the current level of inside ownership 
at public corporations.
Obviously, 20 percent is only an average. At one extreme, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) report that approximately
5 percent of the firms on the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges have majority shareholders. Mikkelson and Partch 
(1989) likewise report that insiders control more than half of all 
votes in 9 percent of their sample firms. In 27 percent of their 
firms, insiders control 30 percent of the votes, an ownership 
level at which some commentators believe that a hostile 
takeover attempt cannot succeed. At the other extreme, some 
notable, often large, corporations have no external 
blockholders and management owns only a small percentage of 
the common stock. General Electric is such a corporation. 
According to its latest proxy, the directors and officers 
collectively own less than 1 percent of the stock, and no 
individual shareholder owns 5 percent or more of the stock. 
It is the quintessential diffusely held corporation.
Although most research on ownership concentration 
considers only the aggregate ownership of directors and 
officers, some papers also consider the stock ownership of the 
chief executive officer. Mehran (1995), in one such study, 
documents an average ownership by the chief executive and his 
immediate family of 5.9 percent (median: 1.2 percent) for 153 
randomly selected manufacturing firms listed on Compustat.5 
Denis and Sarin (1999) find average CEO ownership of
7.2 percent (median: 0.3 percent) for a random sample of 
CRSP-listed firms selected in 1983. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
report average ownership of only 1.0 percent (median:
0.03 percent) for 1984, but they examine only large firms.
Studies infrequently address the stock ownership of outside 
blockholders who do not serve on the board of directors. The 
significance of this omission is an open question. On the one 
hand, several studies (for example, Holderness and Sheehan 
[1988]) report that large-block shareholders or their 
representatives almost always serve as directors or officers, thus 
their ownership should be included in the total for the directors 
and officers. On the other hand, several theoretical studies 
posit a monitoring role for outside blockholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny [1986], for instance), in which case the ownership of 
blockholders would not be included if they are not directors.
Mehran (1995) is one of the few studies to look at the stock 
ownership of outside blockholders, which he and many 
researchers classify as individuals or entities owning at least
5 percent of the stock (because this triggers a mandatory SEC 
filing for all shareholders). He finds that 56 percent of a sample 
of randomly selected manufacturing firms had outside 
blockholders (23 percent of those were individuals, 23 percent 
were other corporations, and 54 percent were institutions).
2.1 The Stability of Block Ownership
The stability of block ownership goes to the essential organi-
zational role of large shareholders. Some models, such as 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), posit that block ownership will be 
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are constantly monitoring management. Other models posit 
that blockholders enter and exit a firm as conditions change.
Barclay and Holderness (1989) find that once a firm has a 
large-block shareholder (independent of whether the 
blockholder or a representative sits on the board of directors), 
the firm usually has a blockholder five years later. More 
specifically, examining a sample of firms randomly selected 
from Spectrum 5 (which covers only firms with 5 percent or 
more shareholders), they find that only 4 percent of the firms 
that had 5 percent or more blockholders did not have one five 
years later. None of the firms that lost all of their blockholders 
initially had a block in place of 25 percent or more. Barclay and 
Holderness also report that the largest block in a firm tends to 
increase in fractional size over time.
Denis and Sarin (1999) likewise follow firms for five years 
(albeit a different sample of firms for a different time period). 
They find that firms that start the five-year period with low 
inside ownership normally end the period with low inside 
ownership. Firms that start with high inside ownership (which 
they define as more than 15 percent), however, typically 
experience a decline of approximately five percentage points. 
In addition, they find that within a given firm, inside 
ownership tends to be relatively stable over time. Specifically, 
they report that for those firms that have been in existence for 
at least five years (388 observations), two-thirds of them show 
a change in inside stock ownership of less than five percentage 
points over that period. Eighty-five percent of the firms show 
an absolute change in the proportion of stock controlled by 
directors and officers of less than 10 percent of the votes.
It is hard to know if these documented ownership changes 
are economically significant because we know little about the 
parameters of control. How does control change with 
fractional ownership? Is there some minimum threshold? Does 
it vary firm by firm? Does it depend on the existence of other 
blockholders? Does it depend on firm characteristics? Such 
potentially key issues have hardly been raised, much less 
investigated, in the literature.
A final data issue concerns the accuracy of the ownership 
data. As most ownership data come from proxies, and firms are 
subject to legal penalties if they report inaccurate or misleading 
information, it is generally assumed that ownership data are 
highly accurate. Although the data in the proxies may be 
accurate, firms are inconsistent in how they report indirect 
ownership. Indirect ownership arises when a director or officer 
shares voting rights over a block of stock but does not have the 
exclusive right to any attendant dividends. An example would 
be if a director is also a director of another corporation that 
owns a large-percentage block. Although such relationships are 
inevitably revealed in proxies, firms are inconsistent as to 
whether they include indirect ownership in the aggregate stock 
ownership of the directors and officers as a group. This is the 
figure used in most academic studies.
This inconsistency can be illustrated by comparing the 1995 
proxies for Hershey Foods Company and St. Joe Paper 
Company. At the time, the CEO of Hershey was also a 
trustee of the Hershey Trust, which owned a majority of the 
common stock of Hershey Foods. Although a footnote in the 
proxy clearly describes this relationship, the Hershey Trust’s 
block was not included in the total beneficial ownership of 
officers and directors. In contrast, the CEO of St. Joe Paper 
Company was a trustee of the Alfred duPont Charitable 
Trust, which similarly owned a majority of St. Joe Paper. In 
this case, however, the block held by the Trust was included 
in the total beneficial ownership of officers and directors. To 
date, this potential data problem has hardly been recog-
nized. Whether it changes the findings reported in the 
literature is unknown.
3. What Motivates Block Ownership?
One of the foundations of modern finance is diversification. The 
capital asset pricing model, to take one example, assumes that 
investors will hold diversified portfolios to eliminate diversifiable 
risk. What motivates some individuals and organizations 
presumably to forgo the benefits of diversification by 
concentrating much of their wealth in the stock of a single firm?
Large-block ownership can be motivated by two factors: the 
shared benefits of control and the private benefits of control. 
The two are not mutually exclusive; indeed, the empirical 
evidence suggests that both factors typically are at work.
The shared benefits of control arise from the superior 
management or monitoring that can result from the substantial 
collocation of decision rights and wealth effects that come with 
large-block ownership. As the ownership stake of a blockholder 
increases, ceteris paribus, he has a greater incentive to increase 
firm value. To the extent that these higher cash flows are shared 
with minority shareholders, they constitute shared benefits of 
control. Several theoretical models, such as Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), stress the shared benefits of control.
Empirical support for the existence of shared benefits comes 
from several sources. First, blockholders or their repre-
sentatives usually serve as directors and officers, which puts 
them in the position to influence management decisions 
directly. Second, there is evidence that formations of blocks are 
associated with abnormal stock price increases (see, for 
instance, Mikkelson and Ruback [1985]). Third, there is also 
evidence that the trades of large blocks are associated with 
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1992). If blockholders do not affect the cash flows that 
eventually accrue to minority shareholders, such stock price 
changes would be hard to explain.6
Blockholders also have the incentive to use their voting 
power to consume corporate resources or to enjoy corporate 
benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders. These 
are the private benefits of control. Such benefits could either be 
pecuniary, such as excess salary for an individual blockholder 
or synergies in production for a corporate blockholder, or they 
could be nonpecuniary, such as the amenities that apparently 
come from controlling corporations like professional sports 
teams and newspapers. Private benefits can also be negative if 
blockholders incur personal costs from monitoring or from 
lawsuits brought by disgruntled minority shareholders or 
government officials.
Barclay and Holderness (1989) were the first to offer 
systematic evidence of private benefits for large shareholders by 
studying the pricing of trades of large-percentage blocks of 
common stock.7  They reason that if all shareholders receive 
corporate benefits in proportion to their fractional ownership—
in other words, if there are no private benefits from block 
ownership—blocks should trade at the exchange price. 
Conversely, if large-block shareholders anticipate using their 
voting power to secure (positive) benefits that do not accrue to 
smaller shareholders, then blocks should trade at a premium to 
the exchange price, with the premiums approximating the 
discounted value of the (net) private benefits. However, if 
blockholders expect to bear net private costs, then blocks should 
trade at a discount to the exchange price.
The salient finding in Barclay and Holderness (1989) is that 
trades of large blocks of stock are typically priced at substantial 
premiums to the post-announcement exchange price (average: 
20 percent, median: 16 percent).8 They interpret these 
premiums as suggesting that in most firms the net private 
benefits of large-block ownership are positive.
Additional support for the private-benefits hypothesis 
comes from the Barclay and Holderness cross-sectional 
regression analyses of the premiums. They find that premiums 
tend to be larger as the fractional size of a block increases, 
holding other variables constant. This is consistent with the 
existence of private benefits. A larger fractional block increases 
the degree of control the block purchaser will realize. Barclay 
and Holderness also find a positive relationship between firm 
performance before the trade and the size of the premium. This 
likewise appears consistent with private benefits, as more 
profitable firms are likely to offer greater private benefits. For 
example, there are likely to be more corporate funds to pay a 
large salary to the blockholder; joint ventures with another 
company controlled by the blockholder are also more likely to 
be more profitable if the company has been successful in the 
past. Conversely, the authors find that when prior firm 
performance has been poor, blocks sometimes trade at 
discounts to the exchange price. This occurs in approximately 
20 percent of their observations. It suggests that in some firms, 
the net private benefits of control are negative.
Subsequent studies have confirmed that block trades are 
generally priced at premiums to the exchange price. These 
studies also interpret the block premiums as reflecting 
anticipated private benefits of control. Mikkelson and Regassa 
(1991) document an average premium of 9.2 percent (median: 
5.5 percent) for a sample of thirty-seven trades between 1978 
and 1987. Chang and Mayers (1995) report premiums that 
average 13.6 percent (median: 10.1 percent).9 They also find 
that premiums tend to be larger when the blocks exceed
25 percent of the firm’s outstanding common stock.
Premiums on negotiated large-block trades, and the net 
private benefits they reflect, are apparently not limited to U.S. 
corporations. Nicodano and Sembenelli (2000) document 
premiums of 27 percent (median: 8.3 percent) for negotiated 
trades of large blocks of stock in Italian corporations. The 
authors speculate that the larger premiums, compared with 
those of U.S. companies, reflect the paucity of legal constraints 
on large shareholders and hence the greater opportunities for 
private benefits in Italy.10
Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) offer additional 
support for the private-benefits hypothesis through an analysis 
of discounts on closed-end funds. They document that these 
discounts tend to be significantly larger when fund managers or 
those affiliated with them own a large-percentage block. Because 
managers would appear to have the power to open the funds and 
distribute the assets to shareholders, the reason for not doing so 
when their firms’ stock is trading at a discount to net asset value 
would seem to be the continuation of their private benefits. The 
authors support this interpretation with press reports of all their 
sample funds that had managers who owned at least 5 percent of 
the stock. These reports raise the possibility that the 
blockholders were receiving private benefits through such 
means as employment of the blockholder and his relatives or 
the ownership of another company that does work for the fund.
It must be cautioned, however, that private benefits need 
not reduce the wealth of minority shareholders. This is an 
assumption of some analyses, but it is wrong. For example, 
neither the nonpecuniary pride that some individuals feel in 
controlling a public corporation nor the synergies in 
production that can result if a corporation is the blockholder
(a common situation) will reduce the wealth of minority 
shareholders. Indeed, both of these private benefits could 
redound to the benefit of minority shareholders; both types of 
private benefits of control could, in other words, produce 
shared benefits of control.56 A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control
The magnitudes of the shared and private benefits of control 
are likely to vary with certain firm characteristics. The 
concentration of ownership should therefore vary 
systematically across firms depending on the characteristics of 
each firm that are related to the shared and private benefits of 
block ownership. This is the spirit of Demsetz and Lehn’s 
(1985) pioneering paper. Ownership concentration is 
endogenous.
Researchers have identified several firm characteristics that 
affect the level of private and shared benefits and thus the level 
of ownership concentration. Most notably, concentration 
(and, to reiterate, this usually means inside ownership, as few 
studies have addressed outside blockholders) tends to be 
inversely related to firm size (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; 
Holderness and Sheehan 1988). This likely reflects 
considerations of risk aversion and wealth limitations.
Regulation also appears to affect the level of inside owner-
ship. A regulated firm has both shareholders and regulators to 
monitor management; a regulatory agency therefore may 
partially substitute for shareholder monitoring. Thus, in a 
regulated firm, the shared benefits of control are likely to be 
lower than in an unregulated firm. The private benefits of 
control are also likely to be lower in a regulated firm, as insiders 
typically have less discretion precisely because regulation limits 
managers’ activities.
The available empirical evidence indeed suggests that inside 
ownership is indeed lower in regulated firms. Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999) for 1935 and 1995, as well as 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) for 1980, document this for firms in 
general. Among specific industries, it is noteworthy that banks 
have relatively low levels of inside ownership.
Kole and Lehn (1999) use the framework of endogenous 
ownership concentration to study what occurred after the U.S. 
airline industry was deregulated beginning in 1978. They find 
that following deregulation, neither insider stock ownership 
nor chief executive ownership (measured in fractional or dollar 
terms) changed significantly. Outside blockholdings, however, 
increased.11
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) note that 
unobserved firm heterogeneity makes estimation of the effects 
of ownership difficult. They also argue that panel data have 
certain advantages in addressing these difficulties. Their panel 
data findings confirm that managerial stock ownership is 
influenced by various firm characteristics; in other words, that 
managerial stock ownership is endogenous. In particular, they 
find that increases in firm size, fixed capital intensity (which 
they associate with lower monitoring costs), discretionary 
spending, and idiosyncratic risk all appear to be associated with 
a decline in managerial ownership. Conversely, managerial 
ownership appears to increase with increases in advertising 
expenditures (which the authors associate with higher 
monitoring costs).12
4. Are Major Corporate Decisions 
Affected by Blockholders?
I now turn to whether major corporate decisions are different 
in the presence of a large-percentage shareholder. Obviously, 
I cannot consider all major corporate decisions; indeed, the 
relationship between ownership concentration and many 
major corporate decisions has not yet been addressed. I limit 
my discussion to three areas: executive compensation, leverage, 
and the incidence of a firm being acquired.
4.1 Executive Compensation
Although one can think of a host of issues concerning executive 
compensation and ownership concentration, two questions 
jump to the forefront.13 First, what happens to the level of 
management compensation in the presence of a blockholder? 
Second, what happens to the relationship between pay and 
performance in the presence of a blockholder? One can
ask these questions with reference to managers who are 
blockholders. Thus, do blockholder-managers pay themselves 
more? One can also ask these questions with reference to 
external blockholders. Thus, do external blockholders help 
implement incentive-based compensation for professional 
managers?
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) investigate whether top 
executives owning majority blocks of common stock receive 
higher salaries and bonuses than do top executives in similar-
size but diffusely held firms. (Thus, in the comparison firms, 
the executives do not own large blocks nor are there any large 
shareholders.) They find that the majority shareholders in fact 
receive larger salaries, but the extra amount is only between 
$23,000 and $34,000. The authors conclude that “it is hard to 
imagine that excess annual compensation [of this amount] 
would motivate individuals to invest an average of $66 million 
to achieve majority ownership.” I am not aware of any other 
study that addresses the relationship between cash compen-
sation and an executive’s stock ownership. This would seem to 
be an area ripe for future investigations.
Mehran (1995) examines the relationship between both 
managerial and external block ownership and the form of 
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manufacturing firms between 1979 and 1980, he finds that use 
of incentive-based compensation (specifically, the percentage 
of executive compensation that comes from new stock options, 
restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance shares) 
declines with the percentage of stock held by those executives. 
He interprets this finding as evidence that a firm’s board 
considers an executive’s stock ownership when negotiating 
compensation contracts. The use of incentive-based 
compensation also declines with the percentage of stock held 
by outsider blockholders. This he interprets as evidence of the 
blockholders’ monitoring substituting for incentive-base 
compensation.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) investigate whether 
compensation of top executives in the oil industry increases for 
reasons that are beyond their control, what the authors term 
“pay for luck.” An example would be a pay increase for top 
executives following an increase in the world price of oil. They 
report that pay increases in such situations are lower when a 
large-block shareholder (who is not the chief executive officer) 
sits on the board of directors. They also find that there tends to 
be greater pay for luck as a manager’s tenure with the firm 
increases, but this is not true when a large shareholder is on the 
board. Both findings are interpreted as monitoring by external 
blockholders.
Bertrand and Mullainathan also investigate how much chief 
executive officers are charged for their options. Here again they 
appear to find a monitoring role for external blockholders, as 
the presence of one on the board of directors is associated with 
an increase in how much CEOs are charged for their options.
Thus, the literature is consistent in terms of a role for 
external blockholders in monitoring the compensation of top 
executives. There is little evidence that managers use their own 
voting power to extract higher salaries.
4.2 Leverage
Some theoretical models posit a relationship between 
managerial stock ownership and leverage. In one of the most 
influential of these models, Stulz (1988) argues that high inside 
ownership should be associated with higher leverage. He 
reasons that greater leverage allows managers to increase their 
voting control for a given level of equity investment. Debt is 
thus one way to relax the wealth constraints that are inherent 
when a single individual or small group of individuals seek to 
gain voting control of a large public corporation.
There is little empirical support, however, for the propo-
sition that leverage increases with ownership concentration. In 
fact, some studies suggest the opposite. Holderness and 
Sheehan (1998) find that firms with individual majority 
shareholders tend to have lower debt-to-asset ratios than 
similar-size firms with diffuse ownership. Firms with corporate 
majority shareholders have debt-to-asset ratios that are 
indistinguishable from those associated with similar-size firms 
with diffuse ownership. Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan 
(1999) report that although managerial stock ownership 
increased substantially between 1925 and 1995, the average 
leverage ratio did not increase. They also find a negative 
relationship between inside ownership and leverage for 1995. 
Finally, Mikkelson and Partch (1989) find no relationship 
between leverage and managerial stock ownership.
4.3 Takeover Activity
Ownership concentration could affect the frequency with 
which a firm is acquired in several ways. For instance, the 
frequency would decrease if management uses its block voting 
power to resist external overtures in an effort to preserve its 
jobs and any attendant private benefits of control. This is a key 
assumption of Stulz (1988), who predicts that the incidence of 
acquisitions will decline as managerial stock ownership 
increases. Conversely, the frequency of an acquisition would 
increase with inside ownership if management is personally 
motivated to realize the gains by selling its stock at a premium. 
Broadman (1989), in fact, finds that the probability of an initial 
offer succeeding is positively related to the potential dollar 
gains for top management.
The evidence on the relationship between block ownership 
and the frequency with which a firm is acquired is mixed. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988b) find that the probability 
of a Fortune 500 firm being acquired between 1981 and 1985 
increased with the percentage of common stock owned by its 
top two managers. Walkling and Long (1984) have a similar 
finding for a different sample and a different time period. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) report that some types of 
majority-owned firms are acquired more frequently than their 
paired, diffusely held firms. Specifically, over the seven years 
that followed, 38 percent of their corporate majority 
shareholder firms were either acquired or taken private, 
compared with only 21 percent of the paired, diffusely held 
firms. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level, but 
the difference with individual majority shareholder firms and 
their paired firm is not significant.
Mikkelson and Partch (1989), in contrast, find that for 240 
randomly selected corporations over the 1973-83 period, the 
probability of a change in control—which they define as a 
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ownership.14 This finding apparently is driven by two 
conflicting tendencies. When managerial ownership is low, the 
probability that a firm will receive an offer is higher, but the 
probability that the offer will be accepted is lower. That is to 
say, with lower inside ownership, the probability of both an 
offer and managerial resistance increases.
Mikkelson and Partch (1989) also find that the presence of 
an external blockholder on a firm’s board of directors increases 
the likelihood of a change in control. In contrast, blockholders 
who do not serve on the board of directors have no discernable 
impact on either the probability of a firm receiving an offer or 
the probability that a proffered offer will be accepted.
5. What Is the Impact of Block 
Ownership on Firm Value?
The relationship between block ownership and firm value—
in many ways, the ultimate question with blockholders and 
corporate control—is conceptually difficult. Let us assume that 
a cross-sectional analysis finds a statistically significant positive 
relationship between firm value and ownership concentration 
(be it the percentage of common stock held by management or 
the percentage of common stock held by outside blockholders). 
Putting aside any data problems (the amount of stock insiders 
actually own) and any problems measuring firm value (the relia-
bility of  Tobin’s Q as a measure of value), there are several possible 
relationships that are consistent with this empirical finding.
First, it is possible that firm value is higher because 
managers work harder as their fractional stake increases when 
they get to keep more of the fruits of their labor. This is the 
reasoning in Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); it is also the reasoning behind much of the contem-
porary corporate finance literature, which typically stresses the 
shared benefits of control.
A second possibility is that there are systematic differences 
between firms with high and low managerial ownership, and
it is these differences—not the level of managerial stock 
ownership—that are causing the difference in firm value. This is 
often called the unobserved heterogeneity problem. Consider 
the following example. Firm A operates in a competitive market, 
and this product-market competition provides considerable 
pressure for value maximization. Because of this and because 
such a firm probably offers few private benefits of control, the 
level of managerial ownership is low. The value of this firm—as 
measured either by its market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q) or its 
accounting rate of return—is low because of the product-
market competition. Firm B, in contrast, has a valuable patent 
that insulates it from the product-market competition faced by 
Firm A. Firm B has high managerial ownership, either because of 
greater private benefits of control or because of shared benefits 
from more attentive management. Firm B also has a high market 
value and a high market-to-book ratio due to its patent. It might 
appear from the cross-sectional regression that high managerial 
ownership is driving the higher value, but in reality it is the 
partial insulation from market forces—the patent—that is 
driving the higher value.
A third possibility is that the causation between firm value 
and ownership concentration runs in the opposite direction of 
what is typically portrayed in the literature. This is often called 
the reverse-causation problem. Recall our hypothetical finding 
of a positive relationship between firm value and managerial 
ownership. One possibility is not that higher managerial 
ownership causes high firm value, but that individuals 
accumulate blocks in high-value firms, perhaps because such 
firms offer greater private benefits of control.
The inability to conduct controlled experiments makes 
distinguishing among these possibilities difficult. (This, of 
course, is a common problem in all economics.) Nevertheless, 
many researchers have attempted to understand the costs and 
benefits of inside ownership by investigating the relationship 
between inside ownership and firm value.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a), in a widely cited paper, 
were the first to address the relationship between inside 
ownership and firm value. They examine a sample of 371 Fortune 
500 firms for 1980. They find that firm value—Tobin’s Q—
tends to increase as managerial stock ownership increases to 
5 percent; firm value then decreases as managerial stock 
ownership increases from 5 percent to 25 percent; finally, firm 
value tends to increase slightly as managerial ownership 
increases beyond 25 percent. The first two breakpoints are 
statistically significant. The breakpoint of 25 percent is 
marginally significant in some specifications and insignificant in 
others. This “saw-toothed” pattern of the relationship between 
firm value and inside ownership has become influential. The 
independent variables in their regressions are research and 
development expenditures per dollar of assets (measured by the 
book value of assets), advertising expenditures per dollar of 
assets, dollar value of assets, and industry dummies.
These fundamental results are also found with ownership
by a firm’s top officers and by its outside directors. One 
interpretation suggested by the authors is that at relatively low 
levels of ownership, increases in managerial ownership help to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders. At higher 
levels of ownership, however, additional ownership by insiders 
leads to entrenchment.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) take a similar approach to 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) by also examining the 
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sample of New York Stock Exchange– and American Stock 
Exchange–listed firms. There are some differences between the 
two studies, however. Primarily, McConnell and Servaes look 
at two years (not one), 1976 and 1986, and their ownership 
data come from Value Line (rather than CDE). McConnell and 
Servaes find that Q tends to increase until inside ownership 
reaches 40 to 50 percent, followed by a gradual decline as 
ownership increases further.15 They find no significant 
relationship between Q and either the presence of an “outside” 
blockholder or the percentage of stock owned by such 
shareholders. (The authors are unclear on what constitutes an 
outside blockholder. Is it a blockholder who is not an officer, or 
is it a blockholder who is neither an officer nor a director?) 
They are able to confirm Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s findings 
only for inside ownership between 0 and 5 percent.
Kole (1995) tries to reconcile the findings of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) with those of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990). She examines a sample of firms for which 
ownership data are available from CDE, proxies, and Value 
Line. Because CDE addresses only the largest (generally 
Fortune 500) corporations, her analysis is limited to large 
corporations. She eliminates thirty-nine cases in which the 
ownership data on inside ownership are potentially erroneous 
(that is, the three data sources are in considerable 
disagreement). She then replicates the regressions of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny for each of the three data sources. She 
finds that the signs on the three breakpoints are the same for all 
three data sources: positive for ownership from 0 to 5 percent, 
negative for 5 to 25 percent, and positive beyond 25 percent. 
The ownership coefficients in the separate regressions, 
however, are different and their statistical significance varies 
considerably. The results using CDE data tend to be most 
robust, while the results using Value Line data tend to be the 
least robust. Additionally, in most of the regressions, the 
coefficient for inside ownership beyond 25 percent is 
insignificant. In the two regressions in which it is significant, it 
is so only at the 10 percent level of confidence. Finally, the 
variation in Tobin’s Q that is explained jointly by the three 
ownership variables ranges between 2.2 percent and 0.9 percent 
only. Kole’s conclusion is that the source of ownership data is 
not driving the different results of Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny versus those of McConnell and Servaes. “Rather the 
results . . .  suggest that differences in the incentive alignment 
effect of ownership by a firm’s key decision makers is 
attributable to differences in the size of sample firms” (Kole 1995, 
p. 428).
Numerous other scholars have followed with analyses of the 
relationship between firm value and ownership. In one of the 
more interesting of these studies, Mehran (1995) finds no 
significant relationship between firm performance (both 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets) and outside directors’ stock 
holdings. He also finds no significant relationship between firm 
performance and blockholders’ stockholdings, or between firm 
performance and the outside blockholdings of a variety of 
investors (individual, institutional, corporate).
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) take a different 
approach to study the relationship between firm value and 
inside ownership by using panel data. In theory, panel data 
should mitigate the unobserved firm heterogeneity problem. In 
a sample of 600 randomly selected Compustat firms over the 
1982-92 period, they find that changes in managerial 
ownership seem to affect neither firm value nor firm 
performance.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) take yet another methodological 
approach to investigating the relationship between firm value 
and inside ownership. They regress a firm’s accounting rate of 
return on several variables, including the ownership of the 
largest shareholders.16 They find no relationship between the 
accounting rate of return and the concentration of ownership. 
On a similar note, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find no 
significant differences between the accounting rates of return 
of paired majority-owned and diffusely held corporations. 
(They also find no significant differences between the Tobin’s Q 
ratios for these paired firms.) One interpretation of these 
results is that ownership concentration does not affect firm 
value. Another interpretation (favored by Demsetz and Lehn) 
is that the optimal ownership level varies by firm, and that 
firms are at their optimal level (given the costs of changing).
The relationship between firm value and ownership 
concentration is obviously pivotal to the topic of blockholders 
and corporate control. The studies summarized above should 
all be viewed in the context of a few overriding points. First, the 
profession has yet to disentangle the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value. Which way does the 
causation go? Is there a third factor that influences both? 
Second, the existing studies do not address the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value, although 
most profess to do so. These studies instead address the 
relationship between ownership concentration and the value of 
the stock valued at the exchange price.17 The difference 
between firm value and exchange value can be significant in the 
presence of a controlling shareholder. The difference is any 
private benefits of control. Barclay and Holderness (1989) 
estimate that the private benefits average 4.3 percent of the 
exchange value of their firms’ equity (median: 2.1 percent).18 
Given that the existing studies find that ownership 
concentration can explain little of a firm’s (exchange) value—
usually less than 2 percent—the failure to consider private 
benefits is a potentially serious omission in measuring total 
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I would summarize the current learning on blockholders 
and firm value as follows. First, it has not been definitely 
established whether the impact of blockholders on firm value is 
positive or negative. Second, there is little evidence that the 
impact of blockholders on firm value—whatever that impact 
may be—is pronounced.
6. Conclusion
This paper began by posing four pivotal questions on large-
percentage shareholders in public corporations. Although 
none of these questions has been investigated fully—much less 
answered definitively in the literature—the current learning on 
each is that:
• Insiders own approximately 20 percent of a randomly 
selected, exchange-listed corporation in the United 
States.
• Block ownership is motivated both by the shared 
benefits of control: blockholders have the incentive and 
the opportunity to increase a firm’s expected cash flows 
that accrue to all shareholders; and by the private 
benefits of control: blockholders have the incentive and 
the opportunity to consume corporate benefits to the 
exclusion of smaller shareholders.
• Surprisingly few major corporate decisions have been 
shown to be different in the presence of a blockholder. 
One exception is that external blockholders appear to 
monitor the form and level of managerial compen-
sation. Conversely, there is little evidence that 
blockholders affect leverage.
• Ownership concentration appears to have little impact 
on firm value.
If one wants a single “take-away” point from the rapidly 
growing literature on ownership concentration, it is that small 
shareholders and regulators have little reason to fear large-
percentage shareholders in general, especially when a large 
shareholder is active in firm management.
Perhaps above all, the academic literature highlights the 
richness of blockholders. An outside blockholder, for instance, 
has a different set of incentives than does a CEO blockholder. 
Blockholders have the incentive to improve management, but 
they also have the incentive to consume corporate resources. 
Blockholders that are corporations present a set of issues not 
found with those who are individuals. Because of this richness, 
the literature on blockholders and corporate control will 
continue to grow, and with it our understanding of the modern 
public corporation will deepen.Endnotes
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1. When the book was published, for example, Beard (1933) wrote, 
“In the time to come this volume may be proclaimed as the most 
important work bearing on American statecraft between the 
publication of the immortal Federalist by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 
and the opening of the year 1933.”
2. The notable exception is Dann and DeAngelo (1983), who examine 
targeted repurchases of large-percentage blocks of common stock.
3. With few exceptions, these data were ignored until the 1990s. Gordon 
(1936, 1938) tabulates small subsamples to investigate corporate 
ownership. Stigler and Friedland (1983) use this source to reclassify the 
control structures of the large firms in the Berle and Means (1932) 
sample but do not investigate it further. Recently, Hadlock and Lumer 
(1997) have used some of the data in their historical investigation of 
managerial compensation and turnover, and the data are the 
foundation of Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999).
4. Denis and Sarin (1999) also study a randomly selected (from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices) group of corporations—in this 
instance, randomly selected in 1983—and find average stock ownership 
of officers and directors of 15.7 percent (median: 8.0 percent).
5. The voting power is 9.0 percent (median: 1.8 percent). The figure 
for ownership by all directors and top officers is 9.3 percent.
6. An alternative explanation is that the premiums simply reflect the 
trading parties’ superior knowledge of firm value. Barclay and 
Holderness (1989), however, reject this explication because they find 
that positive abnormal stock returns are associated with block trades 
independent of whether a block is priced at a premium or a discount. 
If the superior-information hypothesis was valid in this setting, we 
should not observe positive stock returns associated with blocks that 
are priced at discounts to the exchange price.
7. Previous research—notably Scholes (1972), Dann, Mayers, and Raab 
(1977), and Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987)—studied block 
trades that were large in relation to normal trading volume but consti-
tuted only a small percentage of the outstanding stock of a company.
8. Eighty percent of the trades are priced at premiums to the exchange 
price. These premiums are often substantial in other dimensions as 
well. They average 4.3 percent (median: 2.1 percent) of the total 
market value of the firm’s equity and average $4.1 million (median:
$1.7 million). The largest premium to the exchange price is
107 percent in percentage terms and $99.4 million in dollar terms.
9. Their premiums as a percentage of the value of a firm’s equity are 
similar to those found by Barclay and Holderness (1989).
10. Zingales (1994) compares the pricing of voting shares and 
nonvoting shares listed on the Milan Stock Exchange and reaches a 
similar conclusion.
11. This is one of the relatively few empirical studies that explicitly 
consider outside blockholders.
12. Note that the authors’ interpretation implicitly accepts the classic 
Berle and Means, or Jensen and Meckling, viewpoint: namely, that 
managers work harder as their ownership stake increases and that this 
benefits minority shareholders. The alternative perspective, which would 
lead to a different interpretation of their empirical findings, would be that 
as managers’ ownership increases, their ability to consume private 
benefits increase, and this hurts minority shareholders.
13. Murphy (1999) offers an excellent survey of the academic 
literature on executive compensation in general.
14. The most important predictor of a change in control is firm size, 
with small firms experiencing a change in control more frequently 
than large firms. The authors find that leverage has no relationship to 
a change in control, but that toehold acquisitions are more likely in 
highly leveraged firms.
15. Tobin’s Q reaches its maximum when inside ownership is
49.4 percent in 1976 and 37.6 percent in 1986.
16. Demsetz and Lehn consider alternatively the aggregate ownership 
of both the five largest and the twenty largest shareholders as well as a 
Herfindahl index of ownership concentration. I have always found 
this to be a strange choice. In particular, why not consider the stock 
ownership of the largest shareholder? For both legal and practical 
reasons, it is difficult to imagine twenty different large-block 
shareholders coordinating their corporate governance activities.
17. The studies, of course, also include debt in total firm value. There 
is no evidence, however, that private benefits also accrue to bond-
holders. If they do, then the use of market values (or book values) for 
debt would suffer from the same shortcoming.
18. In a more recent and larger study, Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan 
(2001) report that the private benefits of control constitute 3.0 percent 
(median: 1.6 percent) of the total market value of the firms’ equity.References
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